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I. Abstract 
The main objective of this thesis consists of two parts, an analysis of special characteristics of 
electricity prices at Nord pool and an assessment of how market efficiency
1
 has changed as 
the market matured.  
 
The analysis revealed that the electricity prices have idiosyncrasies not found in other 
commodities. The non-storability of electricity is one of the major causes for this. Nord Pool’s 
market supply is highly represented by hydro electricity producers. This makes it easy for 
suppliers to adjust their production to shifting electricity prices. The demand side does not 
have this freedom, which gives market power to the supply side.  
 
The fundamentals of electricity give the prices a natural pattern within a day, week and year. 
The prices also exhibit large fluctuations and price spikes due to demand moving different 
power generating assets in and out of the market. Higher levels of demand bring assets on the 
upper, steeper portion of the supply curve in to production (i.e. assets with higher marginal 
production cost). Small changes in demand at this level will result in high price variations. An 
increase in the general demand without any major addition in production may cause a lasting 
shift in the demand curve to a steeper part of the supply curve and may be one factor to 
explain the higher and more volatile prices observed in the electricity market after 2005.   
 
Forward prices have seemingly the same characteristics as the spot prices, represented by the 
high correlation coefficient of over 95%. However, the relationship between spot and forward 
prices gives valuable information in assessing how the market prices the forward contracts.  
 
Efficiency in a market is influenced by the number of market participants and the liquidity in 
the market. Both have increased considerably since the opening of Nord Pool, and one could 
expect the efficiency to increase as the marked matured. However, the results from this 
analysis showed that it was only an increase in the 1 week contract. The other contracts in the 
analysis (2-6 weeks contracts) did not show an increase in efficiency. An extended analysis 
based on contracts with longer delivery periods (month, quarter, year) would be of interest. It 
may show better market efficiency improvement, since liquidity has increased for these 
contacts. 
                                                 
1
 An efficient market is one where information is rapidly disseminated and reflected in prices. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Nord Pool is a power exchange that is a consequence of the liberalization of the Nordic 
electricity market. It was unique of its kind when it opened in 1995 as the world’s first 
multinational power exchange. The good liquidity and stability of the exchange has made it a 
popular object for analyses and research projects. Although the market is stated to have many 
good qualities and is used as an example for other power exchanges that have emerged all 
over the world, many academics have found that the market is inefficient
2
. 
 
An assessment of the market dynamics and history can be a good introduction to the 
electricity market fundamentals. In order to asses this there are many variables one can 
investigate, prices, volumes, exogenous variables, etc, but the most descriptive is probably 
prices. Graph 1 provides an overview of the historical spot prices, and forward prices for 
contracts traded on 30 April 2010.    
 
Graph 1 Nord Pool prices
3
  
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Ref: Gjolberg and Johnsen (2001) Herra´iz and Monroy (2009). 
3
 Source: Nord Pool ftp server base date 30.04.2010 Simplification of the forward curve used the exchange rate 
30.04.10 to turn every forward to NOK, for a more correct approach one should incorporated a currency forward 
curve as well. All prices are in nominal terms 
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Graph 1 reveals that the spot price has fluctuated greatly since the exchange opened. It is 
apparent that the market is dynamic and obviously changing over time. In the infancy state of 
the exchange there were relatively stable patterns (seasonal variation) followed by a 
substantial temporary price increase in the winter of 2002/2003. After this shock there was a 
relatively stable period. In 2005 there seems to be a shift in the time series to higher and more 
volatile prices. Which raises the main question in this thesis;  
 
Have the apparent shift in the price mechanism after 2005 been a result of improved 
market efficiency, or is it a consequence of shifting market conditions? 
 
The thesis starts with an analysis of electricity price characteristics at Nord Pool, whereas this 
is finalized in an empirical analysis of market efficiency. The objective of the empirical 
analysis is not to propose formal models of price mechanism in the market, but rather to use 
descriptive statistics and simple regression analysis to investigate to what extent easy 
observable variables can contribute to explain the historical observed market efficiency at 
Nord pool, and how it has changed as the market has matured. 
 
Market efficiency is a well founded measure of how market participants incorporate 
information in their pricing estimates. The term has some controversies when applied in the 
real world. However, for a market to benefit from the positive economics aspects of free 
markets there has to be some confidence in the market and the pricing mechanism. So high 
market efficiency would probably be prosperous for the market as a whole. 
 
An introduction to the Nordic electricity market and the products sold at Nord Pool, are 
presented in chapter 2 before presenting the data used in the analysis in chapter 3. In chapter 4 
there will be a review of price determination in the electricity sector before chapter 5 
summarizes this with observed statistical properties of the electricity prices. Chapter 6 looks 
closer at how forward prices are determined and how the spot and forward prices have 
historically interacted with each other at Nord Pool. Chapter 7 takes a deeper look into market 
efficiency and problems one can encounter when assessing market efficiency. The model 
framework is presented in chapter 8, before the results of the analysis are presented in chapter 
9.  
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2. The Nordic electricity market 
 
Since the early nineties many countries have started the process of deregulation of their 
energy sectors. The speed and scope of the reforms vary greatly across countries, but the main 
purpose for them all is to open the energy market for competition to secure a more efficient 
and cost effective energy production.  
 
Deregulation in the Nordic area started with Norway’s Electricity Act of 1989. This 
legislation was the basis that created the first open electricity market which opened in January 
1993. In January 1996, Nord Pool was created when Sweden joined. It was the world’s first 
multinational electricity market. The other Nordic countries joined this market as their 
government issued similar restructuring; Finland in 1998, West Denmark in 1999 and East 
Denmark in 2000.  The German area KONTEK joined the market in 2005 and Estonia was 
included in April 2010
4
. 
 
There are four independent divisions within the Nord Pool organization; 1) Nord Pool ASA 
(the Exchange for financial derivatives and carbon products), 2) Nord Pool Spot AS (Spot 
market for Nordic day-ahead power (Elspot) and continuously trading (Elbas)), 3) Nord Pool 
Consulting AS and 4) Nord Pool Clearing ASA. The ownership of the exchange has 
undergone some major changes the last couple of years.  In 2008 Nasdaq OMX Commodities 
AS bought Nord Pool consulting AS and Nord Pool Clearing AS. The sellers (Norwegian 
Statnett and the Swedish Svenska Kraftnät) imbedded a put option on Nord Pool ASA. In 
March 2010, Statnett and Svenska Kraftnät decided to exercise the option and the sale is 
currently under approval from the Ministry of Finance in Norway.  The sale does not include 
Nord Pool Spot AS which is owned by the major grid companies of the Nordic area
5
. 
 
The Nord Pool ASA´s
6
 primary market can be divided into three; a “physical market” (Elspot 
and Elbas), a “financial market” and a market for carbon emission (EUA and CER).These 
markets are discussed in detail in chapter 2.1 – 2.3. 
 
                                                 
4
 Despite the fact that Nord Pool contains area outside the Nordic region will it in this paper be addressed as the 
Nordic area 
5
 Statnett(NO, 30%),Svenska Kraftnat(SE, 30%) Fingrid(FI, 20%) and Snerginet (DK, 20%) 
6
 Called Noord Pool in the remaining document  
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The success of Nord Pool can to some extent be given to the variety of energy production 
resources in the Nordic countries, see Table 1. This characteristic gives the market a 
possibility to diversify its dependency on different types of resources throughout the day and 
year. As can be seen from the table, Norway mainly produces energy from hydropower in 
contrast to Denmark which is primarily driven by coal and natural gas, and Sweden by 
nuclear power generation.  
 
Table 1 Energy production Nordic contries, owerview 2008 
7
 
Nordic Denmark Finland Norway Sweden
Population mill. 24,9 5,5 5,3 4,8 9,3
Total consumption TWh 396,1 36,1 87,0 128,9 144,1
Maximum load GW 59,3 6,1 12,5 18,4 22,2
Electricity generation TWh 397,5 34,6 74,1 142,7 146,0
Breakdown of electricity generation
Hydropower % 42 0 23 98 47
Nuclear Power % 18 - 30 - 42
Other thermal power % 35 80 47 1 10
Wind power % 5 20 0 1 1  
 
More on this topic will be discussed when characteristics of electricity prices are reviewed in 
chapter 4. In the following the different markets will be described closer.  
 
2.1 The physical market 
The “physical market” in Nord Pool consists of Elspot and Elbas and is operated by Nord 
Pool Spot AS. Elspot is a marketplace where day-ahead electric power contracts are traded for 
physical delivery for each hour of the following day. Market participants submit their bids for 
each hour of the following day, and a “system price” for each hour is calculated based on the 
aggregated demand and supply. The system price is set regardless of any capacity limits 
(“bottlenecks”) in the grid in and between the countries/market areas.  The system price can 
therefore be defined as the market clearing price when there are no transmission constrains. 
The price is also used as the reference price for the financial market. If there are bottleneck 
situations between two countries or market areas (Norway is divided into 5 markets and 
Denmark into 2), the pricing mechanism in the spot market will adjust the price for the 
involved areas. Internal bottlenecks within a defined market area are managed directly by the 
national grid operators.  
                                                 
7
 Source: NORDEL 
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Graph 2 shows the traded volume for the Nord Pool spot market and its share of total energy 
consumption. There has been a steady increase in total traded volume from 20 TWh and 17% 
market share in 1995 when the Nord Pool market opened, to 285 TWh and a market share of 
76% in 2009. 
 
Graph 2 Traded volume and market share Spot Market
8
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Due to the non-storability characteristics of electricity, market participants may need to adjust 
their power balance after the closing of the spot market. For this Elbas is available, here one 
can trade hour contracts until one hour before delivery.  
2.2 The financial market 
In the financial market one can buy different power derivatives, giving the market participants 
the opportunity to hedge risk and secure future prices. The derivatives available are; 1) Base 
and Peak load futures, 2) Forwards, 3) Option and 4) Contracts for Difference (CfD). The 
reference price for these contracts is the system price defined in the spot market. Trading time 
horizon is from a minimum of one day to a maximum of 6 years. There are contracts for daily, 
weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual periods. There is no physical delivery in the financial 
market. From 2009 it has been possible to trade Nordic, German, Dutch and British Power 
                                                 
8
 An approximation is used to find the total consumption in the market in the years were new markets 
participants joined Nord Pool. Norway from 1993, Sweden is included from1996, in 1998 is half of the finish 
consumption included, and in 1999 half of the Danish, from 2000 the hole marked consumption is included 
Source:  Nord Pool(volume) and NORDEL(consumption)) 
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derivatives on the exchange. Nord Pool Clearing AS is the counterpart in every trade which 
gives the market participants confidence in the market, increases the liquidity and is a big 
contributor to the success of the Nord Pool market.  
 
2.2.1 Forwards and Futures  
A forward contract and a futures contract are both binding agreements between a buyer and a 
seller for a fixed amount of power at future time period for an agreed price. The futures 
contracts at Nord Pool are daily and weekly contracts, whereas forward contracts are traded 
for monthly, quarterly and yearly time periods, see figure 1. The other difference between 
these contracts beside the length is how the contracts are settled. For the futures contracts 
there is a mark-to-market settlement which covers gains or losses from day-to-day changes in 
the daily closing price of each contract, while forward contracts are settled at the expiration 
date.  
 
Figure 1 Product structure for forward and futures contracts
9
  
 
 
 
 
2.2.2 Options  
An option is a contract between a buyer and a seller that gives the buyer the right but not the 
obligation, to buy (call option) or to sell (put option) a forward contract on the option's 
expiration date, at an agreed price. The option can be used as an insurance against high or low 
prices. The option is a very strong financial instrument in the power market because of the 
high volatility. Nord Pool lists options for trading for the nearest 2 quarters and 2 years.  
 
                                                 
9
 Nord Pool: The financial market, an introduction to Nord pool’s financial market and its products.  
 
Futures                                                                             Forward 
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2.2.3 Contracts for Difference (CfD) 
If bottlenecks occur in the grid, the price mechanism will create different prices for the 
different countries/market areas giving the market participant a certain price risk if they try to 
hedge just using forward/futures.  With the use of CfDs it is possible to hedge away this risk.  
A CfD is a forward contract with the reference to the different area-prices and the system-
price. The price of the contract reflects the market's expected price difference between the two 
markets, consequently the price difference can be both positive and negative. Nord Pool 
trades CfD contracts for the nearest 2 months, 3 quarters and 3 years. Kristiansen (2004) 
concluded in his analysis that CfD traded at Nord Pool on average seems to be overpriced. 
 
The financial market has overall grown rapidly since the turn of the century with a slight 
decline after the price shock of February 2003, see graph 3. From the time the market was 
fully operational (included all countries) in 2000 the traded volume have had an annual 
increase of 14,55%! If one takes a closer look at the market share it reveals a total turnover pr 
TWh of 325 %. This indicates that by only taking into account the financial market, every 
TWh of consumption is traded 3,25 times. If we include transactions on the spot market as 
well, every TWh of consumption is traded 4 times at Nord Pool. 
 
Graph 3 Traded volume and market share financial market
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 An approximation is used to find the total consumption in the market in the years were new markets 
participants joined Nord Pool. Norway from 1993, Sweden is included from1996, in 1998 is half of the finish 
consumption included, and in 1999 half of the Danish, from 2000 the hole marked consumption is included. 
Source Nord Pool (volume) and NORDEL (consumption) 
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2.3 The market for carbon emission allowances 
Increased carbon emission plays a major role in the ongoing climate change discussions. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated that in order to  
limit the consequences of climate changes, the increased temperature can not exceed  2 
degrees from a pre-industrial level. To reach this goal it is necessary to reduce the carbon 
emissions by 50-85% compared to the 2000 level. The carbon emission peak needs to be 
before 2015 for the scenario to strike.
11
 The Kyoto protocol
12
 is the first step for reaching this 
goal. It has too low ambitions to reach the IPCC 2 degrees target with its reduction of carbon 
emission of only 5,2% from 1990 levels for the Annex 1 countries
13
 by 2012, but it’s a big 
step in the right direction. The agreement sets the grounds for the emergence of different 
financial products to meet these new requirements. EU introduced its own emission trading 
directive in 2005 (ETS) which is the basis for the carbon market. NASDAQ OMX 
commodities started with sale of European Union Allowances (EUA’s) already in February 
2005. In June 2007, Nord Pool was the first exchange to offer trading in project-based 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). 
 
2.3.1 European Union Allowances (EUA’s) 
Each allowance has a “value” corresponding to one tonne of carbon dioxide or carbon 
equivalent green gases. The price of the allowance defines the cost of emitting the one tonne. 
When there is a market to trade, an emitter can choose to reduce output of carbon or buy a 
EUA in the market. Tthe counterpart will reduce their carbon emission by the agreed amount. 
This gives companies the opportunity to reduce their emissions in the most affordable way, 
and if the market works it will maximize socioeconomics results when the emission 
reductions are done by the company that has the possibility to it in a most efficient way. Each 
company covered by EU’s ETS in the member states will receive a certain amount of EUA’s 
for each year. Then it is up to the companies to choose to release the carbon themselves or cut 
their carbon emission and sell the right to emit to other companies.  
 
                                                 
11
 Internet resource nr: 1 
12
 Internet resource nr:  2  
13
 Annex I countries - industrialized countries and economies in transition 40 countries in total  
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2.3.2 Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) 
A certified emission is a credit obtained by somebody who has achieved a reduction 
corresponding to one tonne of carbon dioxide or carbon-equivalent greenhouse gas in a 
developing country. This financial instrument is one of the principles in the Kyoto protocol, 
where transfer of capital and technology from an industrial country to a developing country is 
important. For a project to be approved as a CER project it has to be accepted by the UN’s  
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) executive board, which is a committee that is set to 
meet the geographical flexibility defined by the Kyoto Protocol
14
. CERs can supplement or 
replace up to 10% of a company ’s EUA requirement.  
 
Graph 4 gives an overview of the development of the carbon emission market at Nord Pool. 
Traded volume has tripled since it was introduced in 2005, with a peak in 2008. The majority 
part of the traded volume has been settled at the “over the counter” (OTC) market. The 
Exchange market has also increased over the period but not substantial compared to the OTC. 
 
Graph 4 Tonne of Co2 emission cleared through Nord Pool
15
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 Internet resource nr:  3 
15
 Data source Nord Pool FTP server  
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3. Data  
 
The analysis is based on historical spot and forward prices covering contracts with delivery 
from 1996 to 2009, i.e. a period of 14 years
16
. All data are obtained from Nord Pool’s FTP 
server. The spot prices (system prices) are from the day-ahead market, and contain hourly 
prices for each year. 
 
To obtain the weekly prices firstly a daily arithmetic average for hourly prices creates the 
daily price, which in turn is averaged over a full week to obtain the weekly spot price. The 
futures price data contain the closing prices for each day of trading, for all contracts.
17
 
However, in the analysis is only the closing price on the last day of trading in each week used. 
In order to consolidate the data and make them comparable the forward price for the last day 
of the week is compared to the average spot price in the same week. See. Botterud et al. 
(2009) and Gjolberg and Johnsen (2001)  
 
All prices are presented in NOK. The Norwegian bank mid-day exchange rate is the used rate 
to convert the time series after 2005 to NOK as the Nord Pool Exchange changed the base 
currency from NOK to EUR in 2005.  
 
On 26 July 2009 there was an oversupply of electricity for some hours during the night. This 
implies that there was too much electricity generated compared to demand. The system price 
was therefore set to 0 by Nord Pool
18
 but 0,01 NOK is used in the model to make it work. 
Nord Pool has introduced negative prices from October 2009 in their system to cope with 
situations like this one.
19
 
  
The reservoir and inflow data (1996-2009) are collected from Nord Pool’s FTP server which 
in turn obtained it from NVE (Norges Vassdrags- og Energidirektorat).While the consumption 
data are collected from ENTSOE (European network of transmission system operators of 
electricity) 
                                                 
16
  For the overview picture for spot price in section 1 include data thou trading day 30 April 2010.  
17
 The 6 week contract traded at the 29 aug 2003 and 05.sept.2003 (also 5 weeks) is missing in the data sett due 
to the restructuring of the forward market at this time. The forward price for one month ahead is used for these 3 
data points 
18
 Internet resource nr: 4 
19
 Internet resource nr: 5  
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The data set is divided into 3 sub periods 
Table 2 Overview of analysis period and sub periods 
Full sample 01.01.1996-30.12.2009  
1 Sub period 05.01.1996-30.09.2000 Start up face. Nord Pool is still increasing 
member countries. East Denmark was included 
1 October 
2 Sub period 01.10.2000-28.01.2005 Mid face. All Nordic countries are members 
3 Sub period 01.02.2005-30.12.2009 After introduction of EU ETS. EUA’s started to 
trade 01.02.2005 
 
The first period is defined to be 01.01.1996-30.09.2000 (East Denmark joined in 01.10.00). 
At this point in time the market was still in the developing stage, and the learning prospects 
were assumed to be high. It took some time to attain liquidity in the market which could have 
influenced the price development. The market was still under expansion, i.e. new member 
countries joined the market during the whole period. There have been some expansion after 
this period but this is of less importance due to the size of the additional market.  
 
In the mid period (01.10.2000-31.01.2005) all the Nordic countries are members of the 
exchange. The participants have obtained some experience, so one can assume that there is 
some increased efficiency in the market.  
 
EU’s ETS emission scheme was introduced in 2005 and this changed the cost structure of 
production (reviewed in section 4.2.4). The base currency also changed from NOK to Euro. 
By visual inspection of the price history, it seems like it has been a change in the price 
development from the beginning of this time period. The third period therefore starts at the 
time ETS started trading 01.02.2005 to the end of the sample period in 31.12.2009 
 
3.1 A quick glance of the spot price at Nord Pool  
Graph 5 presents the historical development of the spot prices at Nord Pool. An all time high 
was observed in the last few weeks of 2002 and the first week of 2003. The price peak was 
due to a particular cold period that resulted in extreme demand.  Another price peak occurred 
in August 2006 caused by a very dry year which influenced production. October 2008 
experienced the third highest price due to the oil price peak. These examples are only some of 
 17 
the factors that have influenced the high prices but exemplifies that there are several variables 
influencing the electricity prices.  The graph also provides an overview of how the price has 
changed from one week to another.  
 
Graph 5 spot price evolution and log changes 
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As an introduction to chapter 4, a simple descriptive statistic for the spot price is presented in 
table 3.  
Table 3 Descriptive statistics spot price (weekly data) 
Full sample 1 Sub period 2 sub period 3 sub period
Number of obs 731,00              248,00              226,00              257,00              
Mean 226,24              144,75              223,63              307,16              
Max 751,72              358,83              751,72              613,37              
Min 39,08                39,08                89,46                101,80              
Annualized std 109,30              66,54                107,62              98,73                 
One can see that the average price is quite different for the different periods and it is 
increasing over time. A simple t-test for differences in the means
20
 reveals that there are 
significant differences between the means in the different sub periods.   
 
It is obvious that also the dispersion of the prices has changed between the different sub 
periods. The spread between minimum and maximum values are 319,75, 662,26 and 511,57 
respectively. Standard derivations are discussed in section 5.4  
                                                 
20
 With t values of 9,5 and 8,8 
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4. Price determination in the electricity sector  
 
Energy commodity prices are characterized by idiosyncrasies not encountered in financial 
markets or in any other commodities. This can be explained by many aspects that are unique 
to the energy market, both in the way the prices are set and specific input parameters that 
influence the prices. This will be discussed closer in the chapters below. 
4.1 Non-storability: balance in supply and demand 
Electricity can not be stored in large quantities, and therefore has to be consumed more or less 
at the same time it is produced. This convergence of supply and demand results in an 
elimination of arbitrage opportunities over time. Lucia and Schwartz (2001) states  that “the 
non-storability of electricity makes electricity delivered at different times and on different 
dates to be perceived by users as distinct commodities". The non-storability aspect gives the 
electricity prices unique characteristics that do not seem to be found in other commodities, for 
instance price spikes (Weron et al. 2003). The non-storability aspect is also likely to affect the 
derivative prices significantly since it influences the shape and behavior of the forward curve 
(Lucia and Schwartz (2001)). 
 
4.2 Price formation  
In classic economic theory the price in a market is found by the intersection between the 
aggregated demand and the aggregated supply curves (i.e. the market cross). This is the way 
the system price is found at Nord Pool, see chapter 2.1. The non-storability element in the 
electricity market results in some special properties in the shape of the demand and supply 
curves, which give the price formation in electricity markets some uniqueness that can not be 
found in other financial markets or commodities. 
4.2.1 Demand Curve 
A demand curve shows the hypothetical demand of a product that is desired at different price 
levels. The demand curve in electricity is typically price-inelastic and can be represented by 
an almost vertical curve (Fiorenzani (2006)). However, it can exhibit seasonal variations, see 
chapter 5.2 
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4.2.2 Supply curve  
A supply curve shows the hypothetical supply of a product that would be available at different 
price levels. In a liberalized electrical market, the marginal cost of production is a good 
estimate for the supply curve. Within electricity, the curve is called the merit order curve.  
 
Fiorenzani (2006) defines the merit order curve as a map of the ability of the production 
system to offer different quantities of electricity at different prices at a given time. The merit 
order is also a way of ranking the available sources of generation in order of their cost of 
production. Very efficient, but not extremely flexible plants contribute to the left bottom side 
of the curve, while less efficient and/or very flexible generation plants act in the upper right. 
The curve will always be upward sloping, but it’s shape will depend on the inner physical 
characteristics of the production system. Figure 2 shows the short run merit order in the Nord 
Pool market in 1999
21
.  
 
Figure 2 Merit order diagram for the Nord Pool market, with standard consumption scenario 
 
 
In order to make the curve smoother, variations within each production group could also be 
scaled. However, the merit curve is only used as a visual presentation in this paper, and 
smoothness/precision is therefore not that important.   
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4.2.3 Consequences of special events 
If demand approaches maximum available capacity, the demand curve will exhibit a shift to 
the right and give significantly higher prices in the short run. A small change in demand at 
this level can therefore give significantly price spikes. The Nordic market that is so heavily 
reliant on hydro power can also give significant price spikes. If for instance there has been a 
dry year, less hydropower is available which will shift the supply curve to the left and result 
in the same effects. A specific merit curve is only valid in the short run. In the long run new 
generation capacity will change the sizes of the bulks and subsequent the supply curve.   
 
Figure 3 Merit order diagram for the Nord Pool market, special events scenario  
 
 
4.2.4 Consequences of emission quotas on the merit order  
The introduction of EU ETS has changed the prices of electricity. More environmental and 
efficient production systems are rewarded and production systems that have a high CO2 
emission have increased their marginal cost. This has resulted in a swap between gas and coal 
in the merit order, see figure 4. If the market works as intended it will contribute to the 
development of technology and increase the competiveness of renewable energy.  
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Figure 4 Merit order after introduction of emission quotas
22
 
 
 
 
4.3 Hydro power dominance  
The Nordic power market is dominated by hydropower. In Norway almost 99% of generation 
is from hydropower and in the whole Nordic regions hydropower generation accounts for  
57% of total production
23
. This reliance on hydropower gives the Nordic power market 
special features that are particular for this market. The non-storability feature mention in the 
previous chapter is not that strong in the Nordic region. This is because hydropower producers 
can store the water in reservoirs, which gives the producers some degree of flexibility and 
opportunity to shift production to periods with higher prices.  Note that this movement trough 
time is not possible for the consumers, giving the market an asymmetry where the producers 
have market power. Gjolberg and Johnsen (2001) investigate this aspect and found that there 
are some discrepancies in price formation that may indicate market power that is brought into 
play. A further discussion of the storability in hydropower is given in chapter 6.2.1  
4.3.1 Hydrological resource influence on prices.  
Since the majority of electricity production in the Nordic region is generated from 
hydropower, the prices of electricity are highly dependent on the state of the hydrological 
resources. Of hydrological resources that have an influence on the electricity prices one can 
mention inflow, reservoir level and snow pack (Botterud et al.(2009)).  
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The relationship between hydro conditions and the spot price has been analyzed by many. 
Botterud et al. (2009) (analysis period 1996-2006) finds that the reservoir level has a clear 
impact on prices. Graph 5 updates their approach. This shows that there is a clear relationship 
between the derivation from median reservoir levels and spot prices. This is especially visible 
at the major price increase of winter 2002/2003, in 1996/1997 and in the summer of 2006.  
 
Graph 6 Average weekly spot prices, percentage reservoir level at end of week for Norway and derivation 
from median reservoir level (1996-2009) for Norway. 
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The second part of the period (after 2003) has a substantial higher part of reservoir level that 
is below the median. The periods are of equal size, share of observations that are higher than 
the median is for the first period 62% and the second 38% (own calculations). Botterud et al. 
(2009) believes that this can contribute to explain the observed increase in prices in the last 
period.  
 
Another hydrological variable that is widely accepted as a price determination variable is 
inflow. Fleten and Lemming (2003) states that there are high levels of inflow in spring and 
summertime when snow in the mountain melts. Due to capacity constraints, these plants must 
produce at high levels during the summertime in order to avoid costly spill resulting from 
overflow in the reservoirs. This naturally creates a downward pressure on prices, which is 
exacerbated by a low demand caused by high summer temperatures. A comparison of the 
average spot price and the average inflow from 1996-2009 is presented in graph 7. The graph 
 23 
shows a clear tendency for this inverted relationship between the average spot price and 
inflow.   
 
Graph 7 Average weekly spot price and average inflow 1996-2009  
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5. Empirical properties of electricity prices 
 
The idiosyncrasies found in electricity prices compared to other commodities results in some 
empirical properties that can be identified and categorized using simple empirical techniques. 
In this section a further look at mean reversion properties, regular patterns, spike statistics, 
data clustering and volatility is presented. 
 
5.1 Mean-reversion 
In general terms, mean-reversion is a tendency for the price to pool back towards the normal 
level (i.e. mean). A price increase is followed by a price decrease. Electricity prices are in 
general regarded to be mean-reverting ex. Lucia and Schwartz (2001), Lund and Ollmar 
(2003) and Escribano et al. (2002).  Escribano et al. (2002) state that the block structure of the 
supply side discussed in chapter 4.2.2 gives a natural mean reversion of the energy prices. 
They also state that the prices are mean-reverting because of the price determining variables 
are mean reverting (ex. the cyclical nature of the weather). Lund and Ollmar (2003) find that 
in cases were there are unusual load conditions there are a fast mean reversion. Over longer 
periods the electricity prices shows a slow reverting process due to the timeliness of the 
hydrological balance.  
 
5.2 Regular patterns 
Systematic patterns in the spot prices at the Nord Pool market have been investigated and 
identified by many, for example Lucia and Schwartz (2001), which identify patterns within a 
day, week and yearly through inspection of graphs and investigations of autocorrelations. 
Another example is Erzgraber et al. (2008) which investigate long-run correlations through 
the measure of the Hurst exponent and MF-DFA
24
 analysis. They found clear systematic 
patterns within the day and week. They could however not find a clear pattern within the year. 
To illustrate this each pattern is evaluated below.  
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5.2.1 Intra-day pattern  
Demand for electricity varies greatly within the day and influences the price level. An 
inspection of graph 8 reveals a pattern that is clearly related to business activity: low prices 
during the night, increased prices during business hours followed by a price decrease after 
regular hours. There is also a small peak around the time when people get home. All sub 
periods had the same pattern but as previously mention there is a clear difference in the price 
level between the periods
25
.  
 
Graph 8 Spot price variation, intra-day  
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In graph 9, the period has been divided into cold and hot season
26
 and one can see that both 
seasons have similar pattern throughout the day with exception of the peak after business 
hours. This is obviously caused by the lack of necessity to heat up the homes during the hot 
period. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Period 1 has exactly the same shape but due to the scaling of the graph this is not that obvious 
26 This fact was previously detected by Johnsen et al. (1999). A cold season is defined here as any period 
running from October through April, and a warm season from May through September 
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Graph 9 spot price variation, intra-day cold and hot seasons 
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5.2.2 Intra-week patterns 
Graph 10 shows that within the week there is also some predictability in the time series. 
Monday through Friday the prices are somewhat the same, with exception of Friday after 
12:00. Weekends exhibits lower prices than workdays.  
 
 
Graph 10 Spot price variation, intra-week   
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5.2.3 Yearly patterns/seasonality 
Many articles ex. Johnsen (2001) and Lucia and Schwartz (2001) argue that the Nord Pool 
area is seasonal by structural nature. Electric heating and shorter period of daylight during the 
winter combined with colder temperatures and lower inflow result in clear seasonal patterns. 
However, this clear, yearly seasonality of the power price seems to be less distinct in the 
recent years, as pointed out by Botterud et al. (2009).  They state that the recent increase in 
prices may be partly due to a moderate increase in the demand combined with little new 
capacity. This may have caused a positive shift to a higher level in the merit order curve 
(figure 3) which in turn results in a higher share of the generation capacity to come from 
production plants that are not influenced by clear, seasonal price determining variables 
(inflow, temperatures, and reservoir level etc.). Another element that can explain this aspect is 
the increased share of financial speculators in the market and the fact that Nord Pool now is 
more closely connected to continental Europe, which is not that influenced by the seasonal 
price determining variables due to their different production mix
27
.  
 
Since the clear seasonal pattern is not that obvious anymore, it is interesting to see whether 
the forward contracts yet to be delivered exhibit any seasonality. Graph 11 provides an 
overview of the monthly and quarterly contracts that are up for sale on 30 April 2010. One 
can se that there is some seasonality included in the forward price, e.g. the prices increase 
until late February 2011, thereafter it is a substantial decrease towards the summer before they 
increase again towards winter 2012 
Graph 11 Forward contracts for sale 30 April 2010 
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5.3 Spikes and data clustering  
As mention in chapter 4.2.3, the electricity prices often exhibits price spikes. Kaminski (2005) 
states that positive spikes happen when key generation assets suffer an outage or when there 
are unusual load conditions, i.e. demand reaches the limit of available capacity. When the 
relevant production asset is fixed or demand recedes, the price will return to a more typical 
level. Negative spikes occur when operating cost or constraints limit the ability of generators 
at or near the margin to limit production during brief periods of reduced demand.  
 
Lucia and Schwartz (2001) use kurtosis to show that electricity prices exhibit extreme prices. 
They found a kurtosis coefficient of 3,5 in their analysis, which means that extremely low and 
high prices have a higher probability of occurrence than that dictated by normal distribution 
with the same variance
28
. They also identified a positive skewness coefficient of 0,75, 
indicating that it is a larger probability for high extreme values (1993-1996). An update of the 
kurtosis and skewness are presented in table 4, showing that the kurtosis and skewness have 
increased since Lucia and Schwartz analysis. The second period is very out of sync with the 
rest of the sample with a kurtosis coefficient of 14,2 and a skewness of 2,5993. This is highly 
influenced by the price spike in the winter of 2002/2003.  
 
Table 4 Overview of the spot price kurtosis and skewness 
Full sample 1 period 2 period 3 Period
Kurtosis 4,695 4,0235 14,204 3,1086
Skewness 1,037 1,0235 2,5993 0,5721  
 
If one looks at the third period it has been a considerable change, the prices in this period is 
almost normal distributed. This may seem strange when one looks at the time series for this 
period. It is much more volatile than previous sub periods, but increased volatility is taken 
into account through the standard derivation, what appears to be spikes are covered through 
the increased volatility.  
 
Perello et al. (2006) investigate the appearance of data clustering, at Nord Pool they found 
that the dramatic price variations take place during periods of high consumption. There is 
therefore a presence of seasonality in spike statistics, see figure 5. However, this does not 
mean that the spike events follow a deterministic rule.  
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Figure 5 Frequency distributions of the 100 largest hourly return events vs. month of year and hour of the 
day (inset). (1993-2005)
29
  
 
5.4 Volatility  
Volatility is price dependent as fluctuations in demand move different power generating 
assets into the market. Higher levels of demand bring assets on the upper, steeper portion of 
the supply curve into production. Small changes in demand at this level will result in high 
price variations, (Kaminski 2005).  
 
Electricity prices are highly volatile, measured by standard volatility measures like standard 
deviations. Lucia and Schwartz (2001) find an annualized standard derivation of 189% based 
on daily observations. An update for the full period (1996-2009) gives the same result. 
Differences between the periods are minor
30
.This variance is under the assumption that the 
volatility is constant over time. Graph 5 in chapter 3.1 reveals that this is not the case. 
Volatility tends to be time varying and shows volatility clustering. If a time series has 
constant volatility it is homoscedastic. When volatility changes over time it is called 
heteroscedastic. Electricity prices are therefore heteroscedastic. There is a seasonal pattern in 
the volatility clustering which gives the volatility some predictability, with typical low and 
high volatility periods during the summer and winter seasons, respectively (Perello 2006)  
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Graph 12 presents the evolution of the volatility in the market, given a rolling window of 26 
weeks.  
 
Graph 12 Spot price volatility, rolling window 26 weeks.  
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This illustrates both the time varying volatility and the volatility clusters. However, it is worth 
mentioning that this estimation procedure involves elements of ghost features, which means 
that major changes in  estimated volatility could occur  merely because of influential 
observations leaving and entering the sample
31
.  
 
One can see that although a much higher standard derivation was reported for the last period, 
the rolling window estimate shows a different picture. The reason for this phenomenon is that 
in spite of the higher price volatility in the later period, the weekly returns are more stable. 
This is also visible in graph 4 in the previous chapter. Indicating that prices are relatively 
more stable, but the increased price spikes drive the price volatility up.   
 
All of these commodity specific characteristics are contributors to explain how spot prices in 
the electricity market are set. The following chapter presents how the forward prices are 
determined in a market and how forward and spot prices historically has interacted at Nord 
Pool. 
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6. Forward price formation  
 
A forward contract is a binding contract that calls for delivery of a commodity at a specified 
delivery or maturity date, for an agreed-upon price (futures price), to be paid at contract 
maturity
32
. A forward contract at Nord Pool calls for delivery of 1 MWh.  
 
The different theories of how forward prices are found in a market are presented in this 
chapter, starting with a general approach before commodity distinctive variations are 
reviewed. The chapter ends with a quick glance at the forward prices at Nord pool and the 
historic relationship between spot and forward prices.   
 
6.1 Financial Spot-future price relationship 
In financial markets, the spot-forward relationship is defined as;  
)DIV(PV)r1(sF tTf0T,t 
 (Discrete time) or 
tT)r(
0T,t
fesF
 (continuous time),  
where:  
 Ft,T is the futures price observed at time t  for a contract with maturity at time T,  
 so is the spot price 
 rf is the risk free rate  
 DIV/δ is dividend (discrete and continuous).  
 
The difference between the forward and spot price reflects the cost and benefits of delaying 
payment and receipt of the asset. The one that holds the asset has to be compensated for risk 
free interest forgone by not placing the value of the asset in the bank, while the forward 
contract holder needs to be compensated for dividend (δ) forgone by not holding the asset. 
The relationship is often called cost of carry. If the investors are rational and there are no 
market limitations, the assumption of no-arbitrage opportunities will converge spot and future 
prices at delivery date, see figure 6 
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Figure 6 spot and future convergence at delivery 
 
 
If the forward price is higher than the spot price at time t, the market is said to be in contango 
while the opposite scenario is called backwardation.  
 
If the asset in question is a commodity, the relationship is a bit more complex and is the topic 
in chapter 6.2. 
 
6.2 Commodity Spot-future price relationship 
The relationship between spot and futures is different for commodities than for a strict 
financial asset. There are two main theories that investigate this relationship; the theory of 
storage and the risk premium theory (Botterud et al. (2009)). 
 
6.2.1 Theory of storage  
Seasonality in supply or demand may require storage of a commodity. A supplier has the 
choice between selling today for price S0 or store the asset for future sale. The latter will only 
happen if the present value of selling at time T (including storage cost) is at least as great as 
the value of selling today:   
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)tT)(Wr(
tT,t
feSF
 ,  
 
Where, W is the future value of all storage cost (rent of storage space, insurance, waste etc.)  
 
The holders of the asset have a benefit of owning the physical commodity, expressed as 
convenience yield (CY). CY reflects the market participants’ expectations (or fear) related to 
the availability of the commodity during the contract period. The total spot-future commodity 
relationship is therefore;  
 
)tT)(CYWr(
tT,t
feSF
  
 
When inventory is low, the CY can be higher than the sum of capital and storage cost. This 
will result in a negative spread between future and spot prices (called “the basis”), and the 
market is said to be in backwardation.  
 
Electricity is, as stated in chapter 4.1, a non-storable commodity. This model is therefore not 
suitable for most electricity markets. Gjolberg and Johnsen (2001) and Botterud et al. (2009) 
state that for the Nord Pool market the model is somewhat valid due to the producer’s 
possibility to store water in their reservoirs and the large share of hydro power in this market. 
There is no direct cost connected to storage of water if there is available capacity in existing 
reservoir. If the reservoir is approaching maximum capacity, the producer can risk an 
economic loss due to potential spillage of additional water flowing out off the reservoir.   
 
6.2.3 Risk premium theory 
The risk premium theory explains the price of a futures contract in terms of the expected 
future spot prices Et(St+T), and a risk premium. 
 
ttt,f p
Ttt
)ir(
TttT,t e)S(Ee)S(EF



  ,  
 
where  
 it is the commodity’s risk appropriate discount rate,  
 
t,f
r is the risk-free rate.  
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According to the theory, the future price and spot price will only be equal when the risk 
premium is zero. The presence of a risk premium can be explained in two ways.  
 
The first alternative is with a systematic risk approach similar to the CAPM
33
. If the 
commodity has more systematic risk than other assets in the financial “universe” it will have a 
higher it rate of return, resulting in a positive risk premium.  
 
The second alternative is the risk premium explained by specific market conditions, ex. a 
dominance of risk-averse producers wanting to hedge their production. This could result in 
excess supply for long term futures contracts resulting in lower future prices than spot prices 
(a negative risk premium). Botterud et al. (2009) state that in a hydro dominated energy 
market like Nord pool there is a significant difference in flexibility between supply and 
demand. Supply can store water while waiting for higher prices in the future. The demand 
side has, however, low flexibility in adjusting their demand according to the price. It would 
therefore be sensible for the risk-adverse demand side’s participants to lock in as much as 
possible of expected future demand in the futures market. This contrasting relationship could 
lead to an excess demand for long futures contracts which would translate into a positive risk 
premium.  
 
The two theories are not mutually exclusive, but the latter can be used for a non-storable 
commodity without special considerations, and is therefore used in analysis for many 
electricity markets.  
 
6.3 Forward prices at Nord Pool  
Graph 13 provides an overview of the price history for forward contracts with delivery 1-6 
weeks into the future. They basically follow the same pattern as spot prices (graph5). This 
close relationship is also visible in the high correlation coefficient. Between the spot price and 
any given forward price, the correlation is above 95,7%, and the correlation between any two 
futures prices is above 96,3%.  It is assumed that the forward prices have the same essentials 
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as the spot prices analyzed in chapter 5 and the specifics of future prices are therefore not 
analyzed further. A more interesting perspective is how the spot and forward prices have 
interacted. This is analyzed in the following chapter through measures of basis and 
forecasting error.  
 
Graph 13 Forward prices for contracts with 1-6 weeks to delivery 
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6.3.1 A closer look at the basis  
The basis is, as previously defined, the difference between futures- and spot prices at the same 
observation time. Graph 14 provides the basis for 1 and 6 weeks contracts.  
 
Graph 14 Historical basis for 1 and 6 weeks contracts 1996-2009 
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It can clearly be seen from graph 14 that the basis shifts between being positive and negative. 
This is caused by seasonality in either the spot prices or risk premiums (Lucia and Torro 
2008). The basis is positive in more than 59% of the times for all the contracts, indicating that 
the market is primarily in contango. This is also visible in the positive mean value reported in 
table 5.  
 
Table 5 Absolute and relative basis at Nord Pool; 1-6 weekly contract 1996-2009 
Full sample Basis 1 Basis 2 Basis 3 Basis 4 Basis 5 Basis 6
Mean 3.79 8.27 11.06 12.54 13.70 14.06
Std.dv 22.21 24.33 27.82 31.68 34.08 35.95
Mean 1.74 % 3.89 % 5.46 % 6.46 % 7.25 % 7.69 %
Std.dv 8.04 % 10.86 % 14.01 % 16.76 % 18.83 % 20.25 %
Absolute 
basis
Relative 
basis  
 
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for the basis, both in absolute and relative values (were 
the relative is taken as percentage of current spot). The mean relative basis for one week 
contracts has been 1,74%. If one annualize this it will give an annual return of 90,5% when 
holding 1 week contracts through a whole year. This is substantial higher than the average 
return in the financial market.
34
 Gjolberg and Johnsen (2001) state that this is very large 
compared to what could be expected by market fundamentals and they raises the question if 
this is caused by market power from the producer side.  
 
6.3.2. Future price forecasting error 
In an efficient and unrestrained market it is believed that the forward price is a good estimate 
for the subsequent spot price
35
. The forecasting error is found by subtracting the spot price for 
the i’th following week spot from the forward contract with i weeks to delivery ( itit SF ,  ). If 
the mean forecasting error is zero, one could say that forward price is a good estimate for the 
future spot price. Graph 15 provides an overview of the forecasting error in percentage of the 
spot prices for the 1 and 6 weeks contracts.  
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Graph 15 Historical forecasting error 1 and 6 week contracts 1996-2009 
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It is obvious that there is substantial forecasting error both in the 1 week forward prices and in 
the 6 week forward prices. The error is as expected much larger for the 6 week horizon, ref. 
section 6.1 where it was argued that the spot and forward price will converge at delivery.  
 
Gjolberg and Johnsen (2001) argue that difference in flexibility between consumers and 
suppliers will generate an excess of long hedging demand at Nord Pool, with consumers 
paying a risk premium. They also state that this aspect could generate a “reservoir rent” which 
is a cost the consumers need to “pay” for storage of water to later periods. The average mean 
error in table 6 supports this hypothesis.  
 
There have been substantial forecasting errors for all contracts, where the mean values are all 
positive. All forecasting errors are significantly larger than zero despite wide dispersions in 
both directions. Looking at the min/max values in table 6 one can see that the futures price 
has overshoot the spot price with a much higher error than the reverse case. 
 
Table 6 Futures price forecasting error (percent of spot price) 1 to 6 weeks ahead 
Mean Std.dv t-Value Min Max
error1 1,66 % 8,26 % 5,44** -27,5 % 54,0 %
error2 4,23 % 15,59 % 7,33** -36,6 % 115,2 %
error3 6,04 % 19,88 % 8,20** -38,9 % 158,3 %
error4 7,10 % 22,40 % 8,55** -43,1 % 165,7 %
error5 8,01 % 24,66 % 8,76** -50,4 % 146,6 %
error6 8,64 % 26,50 % 8,77** -56,9 % 138,4 %  
t-value: test for H0. Futures price unbiased predictor i.e. mean error=0 
 38 
 
In January 2003, the future price did overshoot the spot price by 165,7%. After this shock 
major errors are found around the times of the obvious spikes in the spot price. It seems like 
the market is now quicker to incorporate new information in the future price. Nevertheless, 
the spiky nature of the electricity price results in larger forecasting error because the spot 
price has in most cases returned to a normal level before the contract is due for delivery.  The 
errors before 2002/2003 have no clear explanation. 
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7. Efficient market hypothesis 
The efficient-market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that financial markets are "information 
efficient". That is, one can not consistently achieve returns in excess of average economic 
reasonable returns on a risk-adjusted basis given the information publicly available at the time 
the investment is made
36
. An efficient market is one where information is rapidly 
disseminated and reflected in prices. The current price should reflect all relevant and 
ascertainable information. The EMH is evaluated by the “predictability” of changes in the 
price. 
 
Fama (1970) distinguishes three categories of market efficiency; weak, semi strong and 
strong. The week market efficiency assumes that the current prices already reflect all 
information about historical prices and volumes. It is therefore not possible to predict future 
prices by analyzing historical prices. The prices follow a true random walk.   
 
A market is semi strong efficient if all public available information regarding the “asset” is 
reflected in the price. For electricity this can be reservoir levels, inflows, imports etc.  Since 
investors have access to this information from public available sources, one would expect it to 
be reflected in the prices. Interpretation of the importance/influence of variables may however 
differ from investor to investor. This could give different results ex post, however ex ante, one 
can assume that some will have a positive error and others will have a negative error. In 
information efficient market the expected mean error is therefore zero. As the market matures 
the participants will close in on a unison assessment of how the variables influence the price, 
they will still make errors but with a another magnitude.  
 
In a strong efficient market, the price includes all information, including insider-information. 
This is an extreme example and is not applicable for a real market.   
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7.1. Previous research of market efficiency at Nord Pool 
It has been conducted numerous analysis which have concluded that the Nord Pool market is 
not efficient. Ex. Gjolberg and Johnsen (2001) and Herra´iz and Monroy (2009). However, it 
is worth mentioning that the efficient market hypothesis is rejected for most commodities 
(Engel, 1996). 
 
Arciniegas et al. (2003) take the analysis one step further and investigate primarily weak 
market efficiency at Nord Pool and how the market has developed with regards to this. They 
found that the Nordic electricity futures market satisfies the weak-form efficiency hypothesis 
and that it has improved in recent years. Although the market is stated to be efficient, it is 
much less efficient than other commodities in their analysis, i.e. the electricity market has 
room for improvements.  
7.2 Maturity of the market 
Arciniegas et al. (2003) state that in new markets, even the most experienced traders may lack 
sufficient information to know, ex ante, what the profitable trading opportunities ex-post are. 
This will of course lead to missed arbitrage opportunities. As the market matures, market 
participants “learn” more about how the market works which allows them to be better 
prepared to take advantages of arbitrage opportunities. Removal of these arbitrage 
opportunities leads to higher market efficiency.  They also state that the higher the number of 
participants, the more liquid and efficient can one assume the market to be. 
 
The Nord Pool market is the oldest of its kind and has therefore been an object of wide 
attention. This interest has probably given the market a steeper learning curve than what could 
be expected if the market participants were to analyze the market with no outside intrusion. 
However, its early emergence may also have given the participant a wrong foundation since it 
was more experimental in the start.   
 
As market participants and liquidity have an impact on market efficiency, the development of 
these factors is presented below.  
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7.2.1 Market participants 
For a market to be efficient it is a necessity that there are many market participants. Graph 16 
shows membership development since the Nord Pool exchange opened.   
 
Graph 16 Membership development Nord Pool 1996-2009 
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It has been a firm increase in members since the opening, with a small decrease after the 
shock period of 2003 but the exchange recovered shortly after. It was a restructuring of 
membership alternatives in 2008, which may be a cause for the small decrease seen in 2008. 
However, membership number alone is not a good indicator for market activity. Figure 7 
shows how many weekly active members the exchange had in the time period from 2001 to 
2004. Compared to the 300-350 members Nord Pool reported in the same time period, it 
reveals that many members are not active. Figure 7, presenting number of active traders, gives 
a more reasonable estimate of the market activity for the period. More updated numbers are 
not available, but one can assume that there still is a great deal of “silent” members. Level of 
activity is also very variable throughout the year. This may result in lower efficiency in the 
market since seasonality in trading activity may compromise the market’s possibility to gain 
knowledge of accurate market characteristics.  
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Figure 7 Active traders Nord Pool 2001-2004
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 Source Nord pool interim review 1 Jan-30-June 2004 
 
 
Another important feature is the spread of trading activity among the members. In 2008, 31 
members accounted for 80 percent of the total turnover
38
. This is an improvement from earlier 
years, but the market is still highly influenced by few major companies. This may 
compromise market efficiency further.  
 
7.2.2 Liquidity  
According to Arciniegas et al. (2003) market efficiency is also gained with higher liquidity in 
the market. Graph 17 shows the historic liquidity for 1 week, 6 week and 1 year contracts. 
Graph 17 Traded volumes 1 week, 6 weeks and 1 year contracts 
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Traded volume for the 1 week contracts have fluctuated greatly, with a peak in 2000. The 6 
weeks contracts have never been traded in a large extent. It was a temporary increase in traded 
volume around 2001- 2002, but today, very few 6 weeks contracts are traded. If Arciniegas et 
al. (2003) are correct with regards to the linkage between market efficiency and liquidity, one 
can expect the 1 week contracts to exhibit higher efficiency tendencies compared to the 6 
weeks contracts.  
 
Botterud et al. (2009) stated that the liquidity for the forward contracts and futures contracts 
has changed considerably since Nord Pool opened. In the startup face the liquidity was in the 
shorter term of the market(day ahead and weeks), while in the later stage the liquidity has 
gone to the longer term products (month ahead, quarter ahead and year ahead). Graph 17 
therefore includes liquidity development for 1 year contracts. By comparing 1 year contracts 
with the 1 week contracts, one can see that Botterud’s statement seems to be correct. One 
possible explanation may be the entrance of more financial speculators in the market and the 
fact that Nord Pool now is more closely connected to continental Europe. 
7.3. Joint hypothesis problem 
When testing for market efficiency, one comes across what Fama (1970) called the “joint 
hypothesis problem”.  The joint hypothesis problem is that market efficiency can not be 
rejected without an accompany rejection of the model for market equilibrium (e.g. the price 
setting mechanism)
39
. If a model yields return significantly different from the market, one can 
never be certain if the imperfection is in the model or if it is market inefficiency. In chapter 8, 
the model framework is presented, assumptions/simplifications that are made and an overview 
of previously tested models. 
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8. Model framework
40
  
In energy finance the term “model” is used in two different contexts with different user 
applications. The first type is “purely probabilistic models”, which are reduced-form models 
which try to identify a realistic description of the price distribution and trajectories of the 
price. This can be used for risk management and derivative pricing. Most probabilistic models 
include a deterministic part and a stochastic part, where the deterministic part includes 
properties that are clearly identified and truly predictable. The stochastic part represents the 
randomness of the price dispersion. There are many models that try to identify the special 
features of electricity with mixed results. As this thesis revolves around the other type of 
models see alternative sources for more information (ex. Fiorenzani 2006).  
 
The other clashes of models are the econometric models, which test the empirical consistency 
of a certain economic theories. They are a simplistic representation of what influences the 
prices in discrete time, and they are used to understand the present price determination and 
predict future prices. There are different groups of models which can grossly be divided into 3 
categories: 
 
1. Autoregressive moving average models (ARMA): the classical econometric 
framework. It assumes linear relationships between the level of electricity prices at 
time t (pt), its lagged values (pt-1,pt-2,…,pt-n) and the values (lagged and not) of a set of 
explanatory variables (Xit,Xi(t-1),…,Xi(t-k)). Together; 
 

 


 
m
1l
k
1j
t)jt(llj
n
1i
itit XPP where t  is an i.i.d process 
i.i.d process implies that the error term has a zero mean and constant conditional and 
unconditional variance.  
 
It assumes that the ordinary least squares (OLS) assumptions are met, reviewed in 
chapter 8.1. This model framework can also be used in maximum likelihood methods, 
but this is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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2. Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models (GARCH): If not all 
the OLS assumptions are fulfilled, a standard ARMA model can give low explanatory 
power or compromise the model’s ability to make good conclusions. The coefficients 
are not affected, but the standard errors will be incorrect which gives wrong t-values. 
The GARCH framework can improve the goodness of the fit and out-of-sample 
forecasting ability when the error term exhibit heteroskedastic behavior (time varying 
volatility, see section 5.4). By including variables that will capture the autocorrelation 
effects in the residuals given by the heteroskedastic behavior the goodness of the fit 
can be improved.  
 
3. Autoregressive Fractionally Integrated Moving Average (ARFIMA) models: if a time 
series has long memory, i.e. an extremely slow decay of the empirical autocorrelation 
between subsequent observations, it will not be identified by standard methods of 
identifying stationary processes. The ARFIMA model tries to find multiple stationary 
processes or long term stationary in a time series that is not found using ordinary 
methods. By using an ARFIMA framework, some time series which were exempted 
from the analysis due to problems with non-stationarity can be included in the 
analysis.  
 
Although electricity prices exhibit time varying volatility and long memory
41
 many analysts 
use mainly ARMA methods in analyzing electricity markets because the complexity of the 
last two groups of models is much higher, and not as well known as the first. It is also worth 
mentioning that the increased complexity should be compensated by a sensible increase in the 
model’s explanatory power.  This thesis main focus is therefore on the models which has an 
ARMA foundation.  
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8.1 OLS Assumptions
42
  
The analysis is based on the ordinary least square (OLS) technique, where one tries to identify 
linear relationships between the stated variables. In order to use this technique there are some 
assumptions that needs to be fulfilled.  
 
8.1.1 Assumptions about the residuals 
 
 E(ε)= 0, ex ante is the expected value of the residuals zero 
 Var (ε)= constant, the time series are homoscedastic, i.e. exhibits constant variance. 
As discussed in section5.4  this is a problem for the electricity prices. It could be 
solved by implementing GARH framework as mention earlier. However, this problem 
is ignored in this thesis.  
 Cov(εi, εj)=0, no auto correlations in the residuals. Including lags of the explanatory 
variable can reduce the presence of autocorrelations. The Durbin–Watson (DW) 
statistic identifies autocorrelations. A DW statistic of 2 indicates no autocorrelations. 
 ε  N, the residuals are normal distributed.  
 
8.1.2 Special assumptions for time series data i.e. stationary process  
In order to test for long term price relationships it is a necessity that the variables are 
stationary. This means that the results are the same regardless of the time period used. To get 
an indicator if a variable is stationary one can plot the data series against its means. If the 
variable tends to cross its means often it can be stationary. Otherwise one can conduct a 
Dickey-Fuller (DF) test. Time lags can be included if the time series exhibits serial 
correlation. If lags are included one use an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test
43
.  
 
tnt2t1tt p..ppp        
H0; β=0; time series is not-stationary   ; H1; β ≠0; time series is stationary  
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If a price series is stationary it is classified as I(0). The time series needs to be stationary in 
order to use it in a regression analysis, otherwise one can get spurious results. If the time 
series is not stationary, one-time differentiates usually makes it so. The series will then be 
I(1). However, if one differentiates the series the analysis will go from looking at long term 
relationship to short term relationship. To overcome this problem one can check if there is a 
linear combination between two I(1) variables that is i(0), i.e. stationary. If this exist the 
variables are said to be co-intergraded (there is a long term equilibrium between the two 
which they will gravitate). If this is the case it is possible to use the price data in the 
regression.  
 
An ADF test is conducted for both the absolute values and the differentiated series for all time 
periods and series. The results are presented in table 7. 
 
Table 7 Augmentet dickey fuller test for stationarity   
Full sample 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010
Absolute -3.281* -1,966 -3,346* -2,246
Log -24,38** -13.04** -16,00** -12,76**
Absolute -3.903** -1,816 -3,922** -2,564
Log -25,66** -12,58** -16,22** -15,30**
Absolute -3.301* -1,733 -3,160* -2,352
Log -25,05** -12,74** -15,74** -14,72**
Absolute -2.961* -1,56 -3,171* -2,328
Log -24,83** -12,71** -14,68** -15,41**
Absolute -2.994* -1,471 -3,185* -2,278
Log -24,61** -12,84** -14,55** -15,13**
Absolute -2.907* -1,489 -3,233* -2,13
Log -25,23** -14,46** -14,87** -14,50**
Absolute -2.986* -1,318 -3,253* -2,234
Log -25,24** -12,77** -14,46** -16,08**
5W
6W
3W
4W
Spot
1W
2W
 
* Significant on the 5% level ** significant on the 1% level (the darker blue had to include one lag to be significant)  
 
All tests are significant for the full sample and for the  period 2000-2005, one can therefore 
state that these parts of the series are stationary. In other periods, the time series are I(1).  
 
One can use an unrestricted method to check if the spot and future price are co-intergraded in 
the first and third period, and therefore can be used in the analysis.  
 
t
F
t
s
t pp   ]P
ˆp[ˆ ft
s
tt    
s
tp = Spot price at time t 
f
tP = Forward price at time t 
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If tˆ is stationary, the spot and forward price are co-intergraded i.e. it is a long-run 
equilibrium between the two price series 
 
Table 8 ADF test for co-integration between spot and future prices 
1995-2000 2005-2010
1W -11,05** -14,33**
2W -7,833** -11,87**
3W -6,232** -8,945**
4W -5,473** -7,951**
5W -4,928** -6,475**
6W -4,453** -6,081**  
* Significant on the 5% level ** significant on the 1% level 
 
The “true” critical value for the variable is higher than a standard t-value, because the variable 
is biased. However, all values are in such a magnitude that this issue is probably not essential.  
 
OLS assumptions are therefore meet for all variables in this analysis, and inclusions of them 
in the regression would give trustworthy results.  
  
8.2 Acknowledged models 
The objective of this empirical analysis is not to propose formal models of the price 
expectations, but rather to use descriptive statistics and simple regression analysis to 
investigate to what extent easy observable variables can contribute to explain the historical 
observed market efficiency at Nord pool and identify changes in this aspect. As there are 
infinite numbers of variables that can have some explanatory power for this relationship, this 
analysis is limited to model framework already defined by academics.  The main focus is to 
use already accepted models to illustrate market efficiency and how it has changed as the 
market has matured.  
 
Fama and French (1987) were some of the first to conduct major empirical study of 
relationships in commodity markets. They focused specially on the forecasting power the 
forward prices had on the following spot prices. They introduced the term basis (difference 
between futures and today’s spot price) and claimed this to be the sum of expected risk 
premium and expected change in spot prices: 
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 ]SS[E)P(ESF tittT,tttT,t   ,  
 
where the expected premium is defined as 
 
)S(EF)P(E ittT,tT,tt   
 
From this they defined a model for the basis predicative power on the future spot price.  
 
)Tt(tT,t1tT ]SF[SS   , Fama and French (1987) model 1 
 
if β(1) is significant it indicates that the basis observed at time t contains information about 
the change in the spot price from time  t to time T. The future price has power to forecast the 
change in the spot price. The more this relationship explains of variance in the spot price 
changes the more efficient can the market be stated to be. 
 
They also defined a model to identify time varying risk premium: 
 
, Fama and French (1987) model 2 
 
Significant β(2) means that the basis observed at time  t contains information about the 
premium to be realized at time T.  
 
Gjolberg and Johnsen (2001) (Analysis period Oct 95-Jan01 2000) use Farma and Fench 
(1987) model 1 as a base for their investigation of the Nord pool market. They found that the 
basis is a relatively poor predictor of subsequent spot price changes, measured by the 
explained variance (R2). In order to further test market efficiency they extend the model with 
a set of simple variables that are easy available. Their main model is as follow:  
 
)Tt(164tTt,T3t2tT,t1tT Season]SF[S]SF[SS    
where  
)Tt(tT,t2TT,t ]SF[SF 
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 St = Average spot price level within week t. If significant it would indicate that there is 
information in today’s price level that can be utilized in order to improve the forecast 
of the subsequent change in spot price not captured in the basis.  
 ]SF[ tTt,T  = forecasting error. If it is significant it would indicate that the error 
observed in the last periods has an influence in the changes of spot prices that are not 
captured in the basis. The market does not adjust their estimates to errors made in the 
previous periods.   
 
Season represents monthly dummies. If significant they may suggest that there is observable 
information (which month “t” is in) at time t that can be used to improve the basis forecast. In 
this thesis, the model is further simplified by changing season dummies to a summer/winter 
dummy. The reason for this is that Gjolberg and Johnsen (2001) only found significant 
seasonal variations for the month of January, and as this analysis already has established that 
there is a reduction of clear seasonal patterns in the market in the recent time.  The final 
model is; 
 
)Tt(4tTt,T3t2tT,t1tT Summer]SF[S]SF[SS    
 
In the following, Farma and Fench (1987) model 1 and Gjolberg and Johnsen (2001) 
extensions is used as a basis to analyze the development of market efficiency at Nord Pool. 
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9. Market efficiency at Nord Pool  
The models defined under section 8 are used in this chapter to analyze market efficiency at 
Nord Pool. The main idea and simplifications made in this analysis follow that of Gjolberg 
and Johnsen (2001)  
 
9.1 Model 1  
In this section, Farma and Fench (1987) model 1 framework is used to test if the basis is a 
good predictor of subsequent spot price changes, measured by explained variance (R2). If the 
explained variance is high one can state that the efficiency in the market is good and the basis 
is a good predictor of subsequent spot price changes. A significant β represent a predictive 
power in the basis for following spot price changes. 
 
)Tt(tT,t1tT ]SF[SS   
 
Table 9 presents the results of the analysis for all periods and contracts. All betas except the 
ones for the second period, 3-6 weeks contracts, are significantly different from zero, 
indicating that the basis has some prediction power for spot price changes. The value of the 
beta coefficient varies greatly between the different periods and contracts. For 1 week 
contracts in the last period the coefficient is 0,91. The interpretation of this number is that 
historically over the period one could multiply the observed basis with this beta coefficient 
and explain 48% of the observed changes in the spot price for one week contracts. In the same 
sub period, one can also find the lowest (significant) coefficient of the sample in the 6 weeks 
contract (0,33). This contributes less to explaining the observed variance in the spot price than 
in the other example with only 3,99% of the variance explained. This is in line with what is 
expected due to the liquidity effects ref. section 7.2.2. 
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Table 9 Regression results model 1 
1W 2W 3W 4W 5W 6W
Constant -2.63718 -3.8782 -3.76357 -4.39328 -4.93333 -4.19088
[-3.35**] [-2.6**] [-2.06*] [-2.13*] [-2.1*] [-1.63]
basis 0.762746 0.521079 0.39728 0.409666 0.420798 0.363167
[21.7**] [8.96**] [6.47**] [6.72**] [6.55**] [5.43**]
R2 0.393077 0.0994642 0.05459 0.0587071 0.0559095 0.0391494
Constant -0.953556 -1.99333 -2.62795 -3.59347 -4.48327 -5.36712
[-1.12] [-1.47] [-1.56] [-1.9] [-2.18*] [-2.44*]
basis 0.780831 0.606691 0.524567 0.566513 0.565471 0.559371
[10.1**] [6.96**] [6.01**] [6.67**] [6.96**] [7,00**]
R2 0.292241 0.164905 0.129117 0.154853 0.166612 0.0391494
Constant -3.80649 -4.75559 -1.90651 -0.724412 -2.39866 -1.47394
[-2.02*] [-1.37] [-0.466] [-0.159] [-0.457] [-0.261]
basis 0.693232 0.525001 0.224381 0.141489 0.29866 0.302608
[11.5**] [4.9**] [1.73] [1.02] [1.85] [1.66]
R2 0.369632 0.0969291 0.0131727 0.00465617 0.0150158 0.0391494
Constant -3.53694 -5.068 -6.86368 -8.1754 -7.37223 -5.01546
[-2.79**] [-1.83] [-1.94] [-2.03*] [-1.59] [-0.968]
basis 0.905773 0.512791 0.502981 0.525886 0.442684 0.32844
[15.4**] [4.95**] [5.1**] [5.58**] [4.52**] [3.25**]
R2 0.482752 0.0878936 0.0927519 0.109083 0.0745787 0.0399498
Full sample 
1 Period
2 Period
3 Period
 
* Significant on the 5% level ** significant on the 1% level 
 
For the purpose of this analysis, explained variance (R2) is the most important variable. If one 
can include easy available explanatory variables and increase the R2, the market can be said 
to be not-efficient, see the reasoning from Gjolberg and Johnsen (2001). An alternative 
interpretation is as mentioned under chapter 7.1. The model is not sufficient to explain the 
pricing mechanism in the market. It has been many analyses which have concluded that the 
Nord Pool market is inefficient. This thesis therefore assumes that the market is inefficient 
and investigates if the market has exhibited some changes which may indicate improved 
efficiency as it matures. Graph 18 plots the R2 development of the first model  
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Graph 18 Historical development of model 1 explained variance 
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 From graph 18 one can see that the model’s forecasting power for the 1 week contract has 
increased considerable as the market has matured. The other contracts on the other hand 
experienced the opposite reaction to time, with a decreased explanatory power as time went 
by. For the 6 weeks contract there were little changes between the sample periods. This is not 
surprising since there has been a decrease in liquidity for contracts of this length. 
 
9.2 Model 2 
This section is based on Gjolberg and Johnsen (2001) model: 
 
)Tt(4tTt,T3t2tT,t1tT Summer]SF[S]SF[SS     
 
None of the summer dummies were significant, the analysis was therefore done again without 
seasonal dummies. The final model used is therefore; 
 
)Tt(tTt,T3t2tT,t1tT ]SF[S]SF[SS    
 
The results are presented in table 10. Most betas are significantly different from zero. Beta3 
represents the market adjustment to error made in previous periods. If it is significant it could 
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indicate that the market participants do not take previous errors into consideration when they 
make new estimates for the correct price to purchase forward contracts.  
 
Table 10 Regression results model 2 
1W 2W 3W 4W 5W 6W
Constant 8.117 16.880 22.579 28.488 36.623 43.604
[4.83**] [5.35**] [6.01**] [6.78**] [7.72**] [8.3**]
Basis 0.748 0.600 0.559 0.584 0.610 0.553
[22**] [10.1**] [8.7**] [9.42**] [9.49**] [8.24**]
Spot -0.044 -0.096 -0.121 -0.150 -0.189 -0.216
[-6.38**] [-7.5**] [-7.92**] [-8.83**] [-9.87**] [-10.2**]
Error -0.235 0.038 -0.097 -0.138 -0.152 -0.159
[-6.75**] [1.07] [-2.73**] [-3.94**] [-4.35**] [-4.52**]
R2 0.469 0.167 0.134 0.160 0.178 0.169
Constant 3.544 6.647 9.127 12.216 15.370 18.926
[1.82] [2.1*] [2.36*] [2.89**] [3.37**] [3.91**]
Basis 0.885 0.685 0.521 0.632 0.697 0.735
[11.3**] [7.02**] [5.16**] [6.6**] [7.82**] [8.72**]
Spot -0.029 -0.059 -0.084 -0.114 -0.139 -0.167
[-2.37*] [-2.98**] [-3.51**] [-4.36**] [-4.94**] [-5.6**]
Error -0.262 -0.132 -0.042 -0.136 -0.239 -0.310
[-4.13**] [-1.91] [-0.594] [-1.95] [-3.56**] [-4.84**]
R2 0.354 0.203 0.170 0.231 0.277 0.321
Constant 25.923 54.243 60.175 60.175 68.916 85.698
[5.67**] [6.77**] [6.33**] [6.33**] [6.61**] [7.42**]
Basis 0.743 0.805 0.642 0.642 0.557 0.726
[12.7**] [7.88**] [4.88**] [4.88**] [4.06**] [4.83**]
Spot -0.128 -0.283 -0.296 -0.296 -0.334 -0.420
[-6.29**] [-8.1**] [-7.05**] [-7.05**] [-7.24**] [-8.38**]
Error -0.233 0.125 -0.107 -0.107 -0.087 -0.044
[-3.76**] [2.2*] [-1.87] [-1.87] [-1.55] [-0.77]
R2 0.556 0.315 0.197 0.197 0.196 0.253
Constant 7.293 24.749 40.606 59.003 84.061 108.724
[1.81] [3.09**] [4.12**] [5.42**] [7.12**] [8.34**]
Basis 0.887 0.552 0.611 0.720 0.697 0.585
[14.8**] [5.15**] [5.89**] [7.52**] [7.49**] [6.28**]
Spot -0.034 -0.097 -0.152 -0.213 -0.291 -0.362
[-2.77**] [-3.94**] [-5.07**] [-6.46**] [-8.08**] [-9.11**]
Error -0.055 -0.058 -0.171 -0.322 -0.400 -0.404
[-0.864] [-0.93] [-2.66**] [-5.19**] [-6.89**] [-7.21**]
R2 0.499 0.141 0.187 0.275 0.322 0.326
Full sample 
1 Period
2 Period
3 Period
 
* Significant on the 5% level ** significant on the 1% level 
 
The spot price variable is highly significant for all contracts and periods, indicating  that the 
market participants do not take spot price levels into consideration for their estimations. They 
can improve their estimates by including spot price levels. If this is done, efficiency could be 
improved. The beta coefficients are all negative, implying that at high price levels the basis 
tends to overshoot the subsequent change in spot price. Graph 19 illustrates the development 
of the model explained variance. For the one week and two weeks contracts there was at first 
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an increase in explanatory power from the first to the second period, before a decrease in the 
third period. For the other contracts there was first a decrease followed by an increase. Again 
it is just for the 1 week contract there has been a substantial improvement.  
 
Graph 19 Historical development of model 2 explained variance 
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The explained variance in the model is highly influenced by the basis. A separation of the 
contribution for each variable for the explanatory power is presented in graph 20 and 21. For 
the extra variables beyond the basis, contribution of R2 should be as low as possible. If it is 
high the market can improve their estimates by including these easy available variables in 
pricing estimates for the forward contracts. The increased value of additional information 
would then have been captured by the basis.  
 
Graph 20 Historical development of the contribution in explained variance, spot price 
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The spot price levels contribution to R2 has changed considerable for the 5 and 6 week 
contracts over the period and has doubled from the first period to the last period. There seems 
to be a permanent shift in how the market incorporates spot price levels. For the one and two 
week contracts, the level in the third period is approximately the same as in the first period. 
They had a sharp increase in the second period, indicating only a temporary decrement for the 
market’s ability to incorporate this information in contracts with this length. 
 
This is also correct for the error variable. Graph 21 shows the development of the R2 
contribution from this variable. For the longer-end contracts there is a clear increase in the R2 
for the error variable. For the short end contracts, the error variable explanatory power is 
reduced to almost nothing in the last period, see graph 21. As previously mentioned, not all 
the beta values are significant for this variable. The R2 therefore only has some degree of 
trustworthiness. However, it is a clear tendency that the errors exhibited in the longer-end 
contracts have more and more explanatory power for the spot price changes which is not 
captured by the basis. This can be a result of the market’s lack of trading in contracts with this 
length. For the 1 week and 2 weeks contract the R2 contribution has almost disappeared in the 
last period, indicating that error made in the previous period are incorporated in the basis and 
hens the participant’s price estimates.  
 
Graph 21 Historical development of the contribution in explained variance, error variable 
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These simple extensions gave a significant increase in explained variance compared to the 
Farma and Fench (1987) model 1. This increase in total explained variance by incorporating 
easy available information further indicates market inefficiency. The conclusion made by 
Gjolberg and Johnsen (2001) still holds. It is only for the one week contract the market 
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exhibits a clear increase in efficiency. For the other contracts market maturity and increased 
efficiency is not that clear.  This could be a result of the lack of trading in contracts with these 
particular lengths to delivery or other market fundamentals.  
10 Concluding remarks 
 
The purpose of this thesis has been two folded. The first part was an analysis of electricity 
prices at Nord Pool, and the second part was an assessment of market efficiency and how this 
has changed since the exchange opened.  
 
The special characteristics of electricity give Nord Pool very interesting challenges. Its early 
emergence and long history have resulted in many researchers taking an interest in the market, 
which may have given the market a steeper learning curve.  
 
The analysis period was from 1996-2009, i.e. a period of 14 years. Although this could be 
considered to be a long period for analysis purposes, the market has undergone major changes 
since the exchange opened, so early data are probably not representative for the situation 
today. Despite this, inclusion of the data is important due to the fact it could reveal increased 
efficiency as the market has grown and learned 
 
It is quite clear that there have been a shift in the prices after 2005. There are many market 
conditions that could be the cause of this. It has been an increase in demand without any 
considerable addition of production capacity, which seems to have shifted the demand to a 
higher and steeper portion of the supply curve, giving higher and more volatile prices. 
Introduction of EU ETS, emission scheme in 2005 have changed the cost structure of 
production and consequently the overall market conditions for production systems. Change of 
base currency to EUR in the same year has also introduced a currency risk and currency 
influence to the price. A deeper analysis of how this has impacted the prices and price 
development at Nord Pool would have been of great interest.  
  
The other alternative for this apparent shift in electricity prices may be caused by changed 
market efficiency. In contracts with high liquidity, the market exhibits efficiency 
improvements. However, liquidity for the 2-6 weeks contracts has been low and stable for the 
whole period, i.e. no major efficiency improvements. An extended analysis based on contract 
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with longer contract length than 1-6 weeks would be of interest. It may show higher market 
efficiency improvement since there has bee a positive shift in liquidity for these products. 
 
To answer the main question of this thesis with a single cause is difficult or may even be 
impossible, but it is apparent that Nord Pool has entered a new era. How the market will end 
up only time will show. One thing are at least certain, the complexity will just continue to 
increase as Nord Pool gets more and more interconnected with continental Europe and the rest 
of the World.    
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